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 1 Introduction
Economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that multinationals shift prots from high-
tax to low-tax countries, especially by means of debt nancing and transfer pricing. There
is convincing evidence from micro data that prot shifting is sizeable (see, e.g., Mintz and
Smart, 2004; Devereux, 2006; Dischinger, 2007; Weichenrieder, 2009) and that it implies a
signicant loss in tax revenue for high-tax countries (see Huizinga and Laeven, 2008). In the
past, literature on income shifting focussed on transfer pricing, but more recently Mintz and
Smart (2004), Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme (2008), Schindler and Schjelderup (2008)
and Hauer and Runkel (2009) have developed theoretical models of the tax-ecient debt
nancial policies of multinationals. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) discovered that U.S.
multinationals alter the overall level and composition of debt in response to tax incentives,
internal nance being particularly sensitive to tax dierences. Huizinga, Laeven, and
Nicodeme (2008) observe for European multinational rms that the leverage ratio is more
sensitive to taxation on account of international debt shifting than it is for stand-alone
domestic rms. Egger, Eggert, Keuschnigg, and Winner (2009) nd that foreign-owned
European rms on average exhibit a signicantly higher debt ratio than their domestically
owned counterparts in the host country and that the gap in the debt ratio increases with
the host country's statutory corporate tax rate.
Governments respond to income shifting behavior by changing the tax code and the tax
rate. Hauer and Schjelderup (2000) argue that income shifting may induce governments
to eliminate investment allowances in an eort to oset revenue losses, thus increasing
the eective tax rates on capital. Mintz and Smart (2004) and Hong and Smart (2007)
point out that international tax planning may reduce tax burdens on mobile capital and
so facilitate investment that can oset the negative consequences of lost revenue. This
conjecture is empirically conrmed by Overesch (2009) who, based on a panel of German
inbound investments, nds a positive tax response of real investments with a decreasing tax
rate in the foreign direct investor's home country. In response to sizeable prot shifting,
the European Commission suggested a transition from separate accounting to a common
tax base and formula apportionment (see European Commission, 2001). Although the
idea seems like a good one at rst glance, since its inception the proposed benets, namely
1a reduction in compliance costs, tax planning, and tax competition, have been seriously
challenged (see, for an overview, Fuest, 2008).
Ever since Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), it is well known that tax competition leads
to underprovision of public goods when jurisdictions cannot use the full set of tax instru-
ments. When rms can shift prots from high-tax to low-tax countries without relocating
capital, tax rates may be too high (see Eichner and Runkel, 2008; Nielsen, Raimondos-
Moeller, and Schjelderup, 2010). Harmonizing the tax base and employing formula ap-
portionment does not solve the problem of inecient public good supply. Scholars reach
various conclusions as to whether there is under- or overprovision under formula appor-
tionment. According to Nielsen, Raimondos-Moeller, and Schjelderup (2010), the positive
scal externality of taxation and the negative aggregate investment externality are respon-
sible for this ambiguity. Pethig and Wagener (2007) argue that equilibrium tax rates are
too low for property-share apportionment but tend to be too high for other formulas. Eich-
ner and Runkel (2008) unambiguously nd underprovision. Kolmar and Wagener (2007)
claim that tax competition leads to suboptimally low tax rates if and only if the investment
elasticity of the tax base is lower than the investment elasticity of the apportionment fac-
tor. When jurisdictions can appropriately tax residents, tax competition does not distort
the public good supply. This has been shown for the standard model of tax competition
by Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) and has been conrmed for formula apportionment by
Eggert and Schjelderup (2003).
This paper aims at extending previous analyses of corporate tax competition under
separate accounting and formula apportionment when rms are able to shift prots from
high-tax to low-tax countries via debt nancing. It sets up a many-region general equilib-
rium model of multinational rms that make decisions regarding employment, investment,
and leverage ratios. The symmetric Nash equilibrium of welfare-maximizing countries
engaged in corporate tax competition is analyzed. In the main part of the paper, only
external debt is considered. By external borrowing, rms benet from the tax shield of
interest deduction. However, implicitly even external borrowing involves prot shifting,
since an increase in one country's tax rate decreases the common interest rate and, there-
fore, the value of the tax shield in any other country. This leads the subsidiaries in in the
other countries to reduce borrowing. As a consequence, ceteris paribus taxable prots in
2other countries increase relative to the prot in the country where the tax rate has been
increased. However, as an extension of the basic model, internal debt is added to the set
of the rm's instruments. However, since external and internal debt are close substitutes,
internal debt does not aect the main results qualitatively.
The approach of this contribution diers from the extant literature on tax competition
in several ways:
1. In contrast to most papers on this topic which assume revenue-maximizing govern-
ments (see, e.g., Pethig and Wagener, 2007; Kolmar and Wagener, 2007; Eichner and
Runkel, 2008), this paper analyzes the strategies of welfare-maximizing governments.
Private consumption eects, as well as revenue eects, are considered.
2. Previous papers on corporate tax competition considers decreasing returns to scale
technology (see, e.g., Pethig and Wagener, 2007; Eichner and Runkel, 2008); however,
this paper assumes linearly homogeneous production functions. Since corporate taxes
are distorting as long as equity is not fully deductible, even with constant returns to
scale economic prots are non-zero.
3. Following Eichner and Runkel (2008), the total stock of capital is xed, but the return
to capital is endogenous. Most other papers consider the small-country case where
the return to capital is exogenous (see, e.g., Wellisch, 2004; Pethig and Wagener, 2007;
Pinto, 2007; Riedel and Runkel, 2007; Nielsen, Raimondos-Moeller, and Schjelderup,
2010).
4. Most papers treat prot shifting as an additive-separable component of prots (see,
e.g., Riedel and Runkel, 2007; Eichner and Runkel, 2008). This paper takes a dierent
approach by explicitly modeling the debt policy of multinationals where debt is an
implicit prot shifting device leading to complex interactions with investment.
In short, this paper sets up a more general model than do previous papers. The main
results can be summarized as the following:
1. Symmetric Nash equilibria of tax competition games are generically inecient under
separate accounting as well as under formula apportionment.
32. Tax competition under separate accounting always leads to underprovision of public
goods; however, overprovision cannot be ruled out under formula apportionment.
Nevertheless, under apportionment, underprovision will occur unambiguously when
a unilateral tax rate increase reduces debt in neighboring countries, thereby increasing
the neighbors' tax base.
3. If leverage ratios are exogenously given, underprovision is the unambiguous outcome
of tax competition even under formula apportionment.
Pinto (2007) and Nielsen, Raimondos-Moeller, and Schjelderup (2010) analyze tax compe-
tition in a small, open federation framework where governments maximize the welfare of
their citizens. Pinto (2007) focuses on formula apportionment only. Nielsen, Raimondos-
Moeller, and Schjelderup (2010) compare separate accounting and formula apportionment
using a rather simple prot-shifting mechanism and consider only capital-share-based for-
mulas; they could not establish underprovision under separate accounting. Furthermore,
Nielsen, Raimondos-Moeller, and Schjelderup (2010) do not consider locally captured in-
come in their welfare analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model and describes
its general features. Sections 3 and 4 analyze market equilibria and equilibria of the tax
competition game under separate accounting and formula apportionment, respectively.
Section 5 discusses the results by comparing them briey, on the one hand, with the
benchmark without prot shifting and, on the other hand, with the policy outcome when
internal debt is explicitly modeled. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
I consider an economy having n identical jurisdictions, with n  2, where the population
in each jurisdiction is normalized to 1. There are a great many identical multinational
enterprises (MNEs) operating a plant in each jurisdiction. These rms produce a private
good with a constant returns to scale technology. Since the production function is linearly
homogenous, the number of rms and output per rm are indeterminate. Without loss of
generality, I proceed as if the total output is produced by a single representative MNE that
4behaves competitively. It employs Ki units of capital and Li units of labor in jurisdiction i
to produce F(Ki;Li) units of output whose price is normalized to 1. Marginal productivity
of any input is positive and decreasing: FK > 0, FL > 0, FKK < 0, and FLL < 0.1 Since the
production function is linearly homogenous, F = FKK +FLL and FKL =  FKKK=L > 0.
By assuming that marginal products of capital become rather large when capital intensity
approaches 0, it is ensured that the MNE will indeed produce in all jurisdictions. For
example, the Inada conditions would guarantee this. The wage in jurisdiction i is denoted
by wi; the common return to capital by r.
The MNE maximizes total prots net of corporate taxes, . Each jurisdiction levies a
source-based tax on corporate income while exempting foreign-source income of domestic
residents. The rm nances investment with equity Ei and debt Di: Ki = Ei + Di, the
debt-to-capital ratio in jurisdiction i is denoted i = Di=Ki. Equity is not deductible,
but debt is fully deductible from tax liabilities in every jurisdiction. In accordance with
most of the literature, I assume that costs per unit of capital C(i) are associated with
borrowing, with C(0) = C0(0) = 0, C0(i)  0, C00(i) > 0, and lim!1 C0() = 1. These
costs reect increasing bankruptcy risks and bankruptcy costs.2 In my basic model, all
debt is external debt; internal debt is discussed as an extension. However, regardless of
whether debt is internal or external, the MNE will shift debt toward high-tax countries, as
will be shown later. The economic prot in jurisdiction i is output minus labor costs and
capital costs including borrowing costs:
i = F(Ki;Li)   wiLi   [r + C(i)]Ki; i = 1;:::;n: (1)




i = F(Ki;Li)   wiLi   riKi; i = 1;:::;n: (2)
In this model, I assume without loss of generality that borrowing costs are not tax de-
ductible. Including borrowing costs in the tax base would not change the results qualita-
1Partial derivatives are indicated by a subscript.
2In my model, the optimum leverage ratio in a tax-free world would be 0. I could easily intro-
duce a strictly positive benchmark leverage ratio without aecting qualitative results, see Schindler and
Schjelderup (2008) and Hauer and Runkel (2009).
5tively.
Capital is perfectly mobile, labor is inelastically supplied and perfectly immobile. Each
jurisdiction is endowed with  K units of capital and  L units of labor. The common return
to capital r is determined so as to clear the capital market in all jurisdictions; the wage wi




Ki    K

= 0; (3)
the labor markets clear at
Li    L = 0; i = 1;:::;n: (4)
The representative individual in jurisdiction i derives utility from private consumption
Xi and a publicly provided good Gi. The utility function U(Xi;Gi) exhibits positive and
diminishing marginal utilities and is strictly quasi-concave. To exclude corner solutions, I
assume that marginal utilities are suciently large when private and public consumption
approaches 0. The representative individual in jurisdiction i owns one share of the MNE,




+ r  K + wi L; i = 1;:::;n: (5)
The government of jurisdiction i pays for the provision of good Gi with its tax revenue
Ti. The marginal rate of transformation between the private and the publicly provided
good is constant and normalized to 1: Gi = Ti. National governments set tax rates non-
cooperatively to maximize the welfare of their citizens U(Xi;Gi). The timing is as follows:
1. National governments simultaneously set tax rates ti, 0  ti  1, i = 1;:::;n.
2. National wages and the common interest rate are determined such that the MNE
maximizes its prots through choice of labor demand, capital demand, and debt,
and markets clear.










= 0; i = 1;:::;n: (6)
6The marginal rate of substitution between private and public consumption is equal to the






; i = 1;:::;n: (7)
I focus only on symmetric Nash equilibria of the tax-competition game where all ju-
risdictions set the same tax rate. A symmetric equilibrium is characterized by Ki = K,
Li = L, wi = w, Di = D, i = , ti = t, Xi = X, and Gi = G, for i = 1;:::;n.
Unilateral tax rate changes give rise to two types of externalities, a private consumption
externality (PCE) and a public good externality (PGE):
PCE = (n   1)
dXj
dti





Market equilibrium Under separate accounting, the tax base in jurisdiction i is the
taxable prot t












s.t. Ei  0; i = 1;:::;n: (9)
Since the marginal costs of borrowing approach innity as the debt-to-capital ratio ap-
proaches 1, the non-negativity constraints will never be binding. The market equilibrium
is characterized by the rst-order conditions with respect to labor demand, debt, and
investment for i = 1;:::;n
FL(Ki;Li)   wi = 0; (10)
tir   C
0(i) = 0; (11)
(1   ti)FK(Ki;Li)   r   C(i) + iC
0(i) = 0; (12)
and the market-clearing conditions of Equations (3) and (4). Since labor costs are fully
deductible, the marginal product of labor is equal to the wage rate. The rm's aliate in-
creases debt until marginal costs of borrowing are equal to tax refunds. Rewriting Equation










7it is obvious that the user cost of capital exceed the return to capital r; thus there are
incentives to underinvest. Holding the return to capital xed, and taking Equation (11)
into account by setting di=dti = r=C00(i), it follows that dF i
K=dti > 0. Underinvestment
is more severe in high-tax countries than in low-tax countries.
Plugging rst-order conditions into the denitions for prots and taking linear homo-







K   ir)Ki; i = 1;:::;n: (14)
Economic prots and taxable prots are non-zero, since the rental rate of capital r falls
short of the user cost of capital F i
K. However, as a consequence of constant returns to
scale, prots net of corporate taxes are zero in every jurisdiction.
From the rst-order conditions and the market clearing conditions, the impact of taxa-
tion on investment, borrowing, wages, and the interest rate can be calculated in a symmetric































































In response to an increase in one country's tax rate, rms shift capital abroad, which,
due to labor-capital complementarity, reduces wages in the country that raised taxes and
increases wages abroad. The increase in the tax rate also implies higher user cost of capital,
which mitigates investment incentives and, eventually, reduces the return to capital. A
lower return to capital reduces tax savings abroad and, thus, the debt-to-capital ratio. In
the country that raised taxes, the MNE will raise the debt-to-capital ratio if direct tax
savings exceed the dampening interest rate eect, an eect that becomes more likely as
the number of countries involved increases. Total debt nD will shrink in response to a
unilateral increase in the tax rate if and only if the tax-rate elasticity of the interest rate,
 :=  (dr=dti)(t=r) is larger than 1=n which is equivalent to t > r=Fk. Hence, if the tax
8rate is large relative to the ratio of the interest rate and the user cost of capital, for the
economy as a whole interest-rate reduction dominates the direct tax rate eect. Note that
this condition is independent of the number of countries n.
Tax competition Since prots are zero, individual income eectively consists only of
capital and labor income, Xi = r  K + wi L. Hence, the impact of a unilateral tax rate










K(FK   r)[t(1   )   n(1   t)]
n(1   t)(1   t)
< 0; i = 1;:::;n; (16)
where symmetry is taken into account. Furthermore, tax revenue in jurisdiction i is
Ti = tiKi[FK(Ki;Li)   ir]; i = 1;:::;n; (17)
implying in a symmetric set-up
dTi
dti


















; i = 1;:::;n: (18)





C00FKKn(1   t)(1   t)
; i = 1;:::;n; (19)
where
	 = FKKKr(1   t)t[(FK   r)t   nr(1   t)] (20)
+C
00(FK   r)f(n   1)(FK   r)t(1   t) + FKKK[n(1   t)   (1   )t]g:
Since dXi;dti < 0, the Nash equilibrium is at the left-hand side of the perceived Laer
curve where 	 must be negative. Equations (16) and (19), together with Equations (6),
determine the Nash equilibrium of tax competition under separate accounting. To discover
whether jurisdictions would benet from cooperating on tax rates, I determine the impact
of coordinated tax rate changes for i = 1;:::;n:
dXi
dti









+ (n   1)
dTi
dtj














9This implies a marginal rate of transformation under symmetric changes of
 
dXi=dti + (n   1)dXi=dtj
dTi=dti + (n   1)dTi=dtj
=
C00(FK   r)
C00(FK   r) + rt(FKt   r)
: (23)
The real transformation curve under symmetry is independent of the number of countries.
Furthermore, the marginal rate of transformation is larger than 1 if r > FKt ,  < 1=n,
that is, when coordinated tax rate increases raise total debt. In this case, higher borrowing
costs are associated with increasing tax rates and public good quantities. For tax rates
close to 0, this inequality should always be fullled. When, on the other hand, an increase
in all tax rates weakens borrowing incentives, extending the public sector saves borrowing
costs. Marginal costs of publicly provided goods are below pure production costs.
Since the marginal rate of transformation under symmetric coordinated changes, Equa-
tion (23), and (dXi=dti)=(dTi=dti) do not coincide, the outcome of tax competition is
inecient. The private consumption externality
PCE
SA =
(1   )K(n   1)(FK   r)t
n(1   t)(1   t)
(24)
is positive, but the public good externality PGE
SA is ambiguous in sign. On the one hand,
a unilateral tax rate increase raises the stock of capital abroad and reduces tax deductions
in other countries by reducing the interest rate and the leverage ratio. On the other hand,
an increase in country i's tax rate by shifting capital abroad reduces the marginal product
of capital in all other countries, thereby reducing the tax base. The latter eect turns out







dXi=dti + (n   1)dXi=dtj




C00(n   1)(FK   r)t(1   t)(C00(FK   r)2 + FKKKr(r   FK)t))
	[C00(FK   r) + rt(FKt   r)]
:
Taking into account that 	 is negative, the whole term is positive provided that the
marginal rate of transformation under symmetric coordinated changes is positive. How-
ever, the Nash equilibrium must be on the left-hand side of the Laer curve, since otherwise
Equation (40) would be negative, implying that each jurisdiction taxes on the downward-
sloping part of the perceived Laer curve, which would contradict the assumption of
welfare-maximizing behavior. Hence, the perceived marginal rate of transformation ex-










Figure 1: Underprovision of publicly provided goods
benet from coordinated increases in tax rates and publicly provided good. The proposition
summarizes this result:
Proposition 1 Under separate accounting, the symmetric Nash equilibrium of tax compe-
tition is characterized by underprovision of publicly provided goods. All jurisdictions would
benet from small increases in tax rates and public good quantities.
The ndings are illustrated by Figure 1. The gure shows private and public good
quantities in a representative jurisdiction in the full symmetric setting. The potential pro-
duction possibility curve is depicted as PPCpot with slope  1 and would be attainable
under a hypothetical fully ecient tax system. However, since costs of equity are not
deductible under corporate taxation, even with full coordination, the production possi-
bility curve lies below the potential curve. The transformation curve under coordination
is labeled PPCreal. In the tax competition game, non-cooperatively taxing governments
perceive higher marginal costs of tax rate increases, since they expect capital ight and
other nancial reactions in response to unilateral tax changes. The perceived transforma-
tion curve is indicated by PPCperc. Equation (40) shows that the perceived transformation
curve is steeper than the real transformation curve, as shown in Figure 1. The symmetric
11Nash equilibrium (X;G), where the perceived transformation curve and an indierence
curve have the same slope, clearly lies on the real production possibility curve. Starting at
this equilibrium, jurisdictions would benet from moving along the real production possi-
bility curve toward a larger quantity of publicly provided goods. In Figure 1 it is assumed
that the real production possibility curve is always steeper than the potential production
possibility curve, but this would only hold when coordinated tax rate changes increase
total borrowing. However, allowing for convex parts of the production possibility curve
would not have any qualitative eect on the underprovision result.
4 Formula apportionment
Market equilibrium Under formula apportionment, the MNE faces a uniform tax rate












s.t. Ei  0; i = 1;:::;n: (26)
Tax bases are consolidated and distributed to jurisdictions according to a formula based
on the capital share Ki=
P
j Kj, the sales share F(Ki;Li)=
P
j F(Kj;Lj), and the payroll
share wi L=
P













; i = 1;:::;n: (27)
The weights of the capital share, the sales share and the payroll share sum up to 1:
 +  +  = 1. Hence, the jurisdictions' shares also sum up to 1:
P
j Sj = 1. The MNE's










The rst-order conditions of the MNE's optimization problem are for i = 1;:::;n










k = 0; (29)
r   C
0(i) = 0; (30)











k = 0: (31)
12Since the eective tax rate is independent of the jurisdiction, the optimum debt-to-capital
ratio  is the same in all jurisdictions. In its decision regarding labor and capital, the
MNE takes into consideration that changes in employment and capital stock aect tax
base shares and, therefore, the eective tax rate. High tax rates reduce marginal benets
of employment and investment.
In a symmetric equilibrium  = ti = t, Si = 1=n, Si
Lj =  (=L+FL=F)=n2 < 0, Si
Kj =
 (=K + FK=F)=n2 < 0, Si
Li =  (n   1)Si
Lj, and Si
Ki =  (n   1)Si
Kj. Using symmetry,
the rst-order conditions and the market-clearing conditions imply that unilateral tax
rate changes aect the interest rate and national wages just as they do under separate
accounting. Hence, dr=dti, dwi=dti, and dwi=dtj are determined by Equation (15).3 The























If and only if r > FKt ,  < 1=n, a unilateral tax rate increase increases the uniform
debt-to-capital ratio and therefore total debt. A negative debt externality would be as-
sociated with an increase in one jurisdiction's tax rate. The MNE would lower debt and,
therefore, tax liabilities in other jurisdictions provided that interest rate changes do not
overcompensate.
Plugging rst-order conditions into the denitions for prots and taking linear homo-
geneity into account, yields
i = (F
i


































k; i = 1;:::;n:
Economic and taxable prots are non-zero; outside a symmetric equilibrium, even net
prots per country are not zero. However, it can be shown that total net prots FA are
zero. Prots and losses cancel out. Hence, even under formula apportionment, individual
income consists only of capital and labor income.
3Wages react dierently in the model of Eichner and Runkel (2008) because their production function
is subject to decreasing returns to scale.
13Tax competition Since unilateral tax rate changes aect the common interest rate and
national wages under formula apportionment exactly as they do under separate accounting,
the impact of a single country's tax rate change on its private consumption, i.e., dXi=dti,
is the same under both tax systems. Hence, if there is a dierence between the two tax
competition game equilibria it must be related to tax revenue eects, dTi=dti. Tax revenue













































gives the impact of a country's tax rate on its share in the tax base. Any unilateral
increase in the tax rate reduces the jurisdiction's share in the global tax base no matter
what the weights in the formula are. Ceteris paribus, Si
ti depends positively on each weight.
Clearly, the capital-share weight aects Si
ti more strongly than the sales share. If the tax
rate elasticity of the jurisdiction's capital stock, (ti=K)(dKi=dti), exceeds half the tax rate
elasticity of the payroll, (ti=wi L)(d(wi L)=dti)=2, the capital share's weight is also greater
than the payroll share's weight.
A unilateral increase in the tax rate reduces the tax base if it increases r, that is, if
C
00(FK   r) + r(FKt   r) < 0; (37)
which requires a positive relationship between the a single tax rate and total debt, i.e.,
r > FKt.
Although there are substantial dierences in individual tax rate eects, the impact
of coordinated tax rate increases is the same under the formula approach as it is under
separate accounting. This is because separate accounting and formula apportionment are
indistinguishable when tax rates are uniform. As a consequence, the true production
possibility curve is always given by Equation (23).
14Since interest rate and wage eects of taxation are the same under both approaches,
the private consumption externality is also positive: PCE
FA = PCE
SA > 0. The public
good externality
PGE


































is positive if a unilateral tax increase either reduces the debt-to-capital ratio or increases
it only moderately, i.e., if d=dti suciently low.
Due to these externalities, the symmetric Nash equilibrium of tax competition is gener-
ically inecient. However, in contrast to separate accounting, overprovision could not be
excluded analytically. The dierence between perceived and real production possibility







dXi=dti + (n   1)dXi=dtj











(FK   r)2 + FK   r +
r(FKt r)
C00
[n(1   t)   t(1   )](FK   r)
:
If FKt > r ,  > 1=n, jurisdictions will clearly undersupply public goods. The underlying
force is the positive public debt externality which reinforces positive externalities via the
formula. A unilateral tax rate increase reduces the debt-to-capital ratio and thus increases
the tax base.
The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 2 Under formula apportionment, the symmetric Nash equilibrium of tax
competition is generically characterized by an inecient provision of publicly provided
goods. If   1=n, jurisdictions unambiguously undersupply public goods.
It should be stressed that even for  < 1=n many rounds of numerical simulations
for various parameters unambiguously found underprovision of public goods. Presumably,
even the negative public debt externality could not change the results.
A direct comparison of the supply of public goods under separate accounting and for-
mula apportionment in terms of exogenous parameters is generally not possible. A system
change may or may not aggravate the underprovision problem.
155 Discussion
In this section, I discuss the results by comparing them to the benchmark case of tax
competition without prot shifting and by subsequently analyzing internal debt.
5.1 Fixed debt-to-capital ratio
When the debt-to-capital ratio is xed at a uniform level in all jurisdictions, the MNE
cannot use nancial policy to reduce its tax burden in response to tax rate dierentials.
Hence, dj=dti  0 for all i;j. As a consequence, there is no excess burden of taxation
when all jurisdictions always levy the same tax rate. The true production possibility
curve PPCreal has slope  1. However, the perceived production possibility curve under
separate accounting PPCperc in the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the tax competition





FKKK[t(1   )   n(1   t)]
FKKK[t(1   )   n(1   t)]   (n   1)(FK   r)t(1   t)
> 1: (41)
Non-cooperatively taxing jurisdictions will undersupply public goods. Coordinated tax
increases would increase welfare in all jurisdictions.
Underprovision of publicly provided goods is also the outcome of tax competition under
formula apportionment when the debt-to-capital ratio is xed. Not only is the private
consumption externality positive, but also the public good externality
PGE
FA  := (n   1)
dTj
dti








> 0; i = 1;:::;n: (42)
Hence, autonomous jurisdictions will unambiguously undersupply public goods.
Furthermore, a purely capital-share based formula leads to particularly severe under-
provision. Analytically it could be shown that an increase in the parameter  accompanied
by a decrease in  leads to lower taxes and lower tax revenue at the equilibrium (see Ap-
pendix). Relocating capital reduces one to one the capital share, but has a smaller impact
on the sales share. The more the formula relies on the mobile input, the ercer competition
is.
Whether underprovision will be more severe under separate accounting or under formula
apportionment depends on the weights of capital, sales, and payroll in the formula. For a














(n   1)(FK   r)Kt
n(1   t)
> 0: (43)
Under separate accounting, there is a stronger incentive to raise taxes than under formula
apportionment. Hence, introducing formula apportionment at the symmetric Nash equi-
librium of the tax competition game under separate accounting would result in lower tax
rates. Formula apportionment aggravates the underprovision problem. I conclude:
Proposition 3 If the leverage ratio is xed at a uniform level, the symmetric Nash equi-
librium of tax competition is characterized by underprovision of publicly provided goods
regardless of whether separate accounting or formula apportionment is applied. A capital
share base formula induces more severe underprovision than a sales share base formula. If
the formula is purely capital share based, underprovision is even more severe under formula
apportionment than under separate accounting.
5.2 Internal debt
Following Mintz and Smart (2004) and Schindler and Schjelderup (2008), I now consider
internal debt as an explicit device for prot shifting.4 I add tax deductions for internal
debt and also its costs to the analysis. The internal-debt-to-capital ratio in jurisdiction
i is i = Bi=Ki. Costs of internal borrowing are Q(i)Ki, with Q(0) = Q0(0) = 0, and
lim!1 Q0() = 1. Costs of internal lending are 0, Q() = 0 for  < 0, costs of internal
borrowing positive and increasing, Q0()  0 and Q00()  0 if  > 0. Thin-capitalization
rules are not explicitly modeled, but could be seen as part of costs of internal borrowing.
Since lending is only internal, the total sum of internal debt is 0:
Pn
j=1 jKj = 0. Economic
prots and taxable prots become5
i = F(Ki;Li)   wiLi   [r + C(i) + Q(i)]Ki; i = 1;:::;n: (44)

t
i = F(Ki;Li)   wiLi   r(i + i)Ki; i = 1;:::;n: (45)
4See also Hauer and Runkel (2009).
5I assume that the interest rate for internal debt is the same as for external debt, there is no transfer-
pricing issue involved. Chowdhry and Nanda (1994) have considered the external interest rate as anchor
for the internal interest rate..















jKj = 0 and Ei  0; i = 1;:::;n: (46)
First-order conditions with respect to investment and internal borrowing in jurisdiction i,
i = 1;:::;n, are
(1   ti)FK(Ki;Li)   r   C(i)   Q(i) + iC
0(i) + iQ
0(i) = 0 (47)
tir   Q
0(i)    = 0; (48)
where  is the Lagrangian of the internal debt constraint. Denoting the lowest tax rate by
tm, the internal debt condition can be written as
(ti   tm)r = Q
0(i); i = 1;:::;n: (49)
The rm's aliate in the jurisdiction with the lowest tax rate will lend to all other al-
iates. The size of internal debt is mainly determined by the tax rate dierential. Inter-
nal assets in the minimum tax jurisdiction are determined by the borrowing constraint:
Bm =  
P
j6=m Bj. However, in a symmetric equilibrium, there will be no internal borrow-
ing.
Although the calculations are slightly more complex, it can be shown that with internal
borrowing, the symmetric Nash equilibrium under separate accounting is characterized by
underprovision of publicly provided goods. This should not be a surprise. External debt
is a substitute for internal borrowing as means of prot shifting.
Finally, since under formula apportionment, the benets of internal debt are always
zero, the MNE will not issue internal debt, regardless of the tax rates. The tax game
under formula apportionment is not aected by internal debt.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper analyzed tax competition when welfare-maximizing jurisdictions levy source-
based corporate taxes and multinational enterprises choose leverage ratios in a tax-ecient
way. First, separate accounting, under which multinationals shift debt from low-tax to
18high-tax countries, was considered. It was shown that in this situation the Nash equilibrium
of the tax competition game is characterized by underprovision of publicly provided goods.
Next analyzed was formula apportionment, under which the country-specic leverage ratio
of a multinational's aliate is independent of the jurisdiction's tax rate. The paper shows
that public good provision is still inecient and characterized the inecient outcome.
Finally, it was shown that underprovision is the unambiguous outcome of tax competition
if leverage ratios are xed at a uniform level.
The model could be extended in several ways. For example, asymmetry could be
introduced. Asymmetric tax competition when prot shifting is feasible has been neglected
in the literature to date. Stoewhase (2005) is an exception, but he considers capital taxation
instead of prot taxation. Asymmetry is studied in the literature on tax havens (see, e.g.,
Hong and Smart, 2007; Slemrod and Wilson, 2006). Another extension could involve
considering the deductible share as a policy variable, as Pinto (2007) has done.
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when @Si=@ = 0 is taken into account.
Since Si + tiSi
ti > 0, sign(dGi=d) = sign(dti=d). Denoting country i0s welfare by
Vi(ti;tj), from the rst-order conditions of the Nash equilibrium, the impact on tax rates








































; i = 1;2; j 6= i: (53)
Stability of the Nash equilibrium implies
dti
d
< 0 if and only if
@2Vi
@ti@
< 0; i = 1;2: (54)












































this implies that dti=d and dTi=d are negative.
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